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ABSTRACT
There is growing concern over the potential misuse of artificial in-
telligence (AI) research. Publishing scientific research can facilitate
misuse of the technology, but the research can also contribute to
protections against misuse. This paper addresses the balance be-
tween these two effects. Our theoretical framework elucidates the
factors governing whether the published research will bemore use-
ful for attackers or defenders, such as the possibility for adequate
defensive measures, or the independent discovery of the knowl-
edge outside of the scientific community. The balance will vary
across scientific fields. However, we show that the existing conver-
sationwithin AI has imported concepts and conclusions from prior
debates within computer security over the disclosure of software
vulnerabilities. While disclosure of software vulnerabilities often
favours defence, this cannot be assumed for AI research. The AI
research community should consider concepts and policies from
a broad set of adjacent fields, and ultimately needs to craft policy
well-suited to its particular challenges.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Although the vast majority of scientific research is socially bene-
ficial, a subset of scientific fields struggle with the fact that their
research can have harmful consequences. Scientists in these fields
must weigh the potential harms in deciding what research to pur-
sue, and whether, and how, to disclose any results. Broadly, ap-
proaches to disclosure can be arrayed on a spectrum between full
publication and non-disclosure. Some fields, like computer secu-
rity, are characterized by high levels of disclosure; researchers who
discover software vulnerabilities tend to share them publicly, at
least after initially warning vendors with the ability to patch them.
Other domains, such as biosecurity, synthetic biology, cryptogra-
phy, and nuclear security, exhibit greater secrecy and caution over-
all, with disclosure norms that are often actively discussed and con-
tested.
The field of AI is in the midst of a discussion about its own dis-
closure norms, in light of the increasing realization of AI’s poten-
tial for misuse. AI researchers and policymakers are now express-
ing growing concern about a range of potential misuses, including:
facial recognition for targeting vulnerable populations, synthetic
language and video that can be used to impersonate humans, algo-
rithmic decision making that amplifies biases and unfairness, and
drones that can be used to disrupt air-traffic or launch attacks [6].
If the underlying technology continues to become more powerful,
additional avenues for harmful use will continue to emerge.
Some researchers argue that the field shouldmove toward greater
restraint in disclosing code and results, in cases where open publi-
cation would empower bad actors (see [22]). Others argue that the
field should be actively open in publishing such research, in order
to increase awareness of risks and support actors who are work-
ing on defences [27]. In this paper we investigate this question of
the security value of disclosure: how publications and other forms
of knowledge-sharing may increase or decrease the harms from
misuse. We do not consider the broader consequences of scientific
openness, most of which are beneficial.
The underlying tension is that a particular publication can be
helpful both for individuals seeking to misuse the technology, but
also for those seeking to prevent misuse. This paper provides a
theoretical framework for thinking through this tension in a struc-
tured way. This will depend upon features of the social and techni-
cal dynamics surrounding the field, such as the cost of protecting
against misuse, and the number of actors who are in a position to
reproduce the relevant research. Much more policy work will be
needed to identify best practice in measuring and weighing these
factors.
Due to wide variation across fields, there is no reason to assume
that disclosure norms that are appropriate for any given field will
also be appropriate for AI. However, we show that the existing
conversation around AI has heavily borrowed concepts and con-
clusions from one particular field: vulnerability disclosure in com-
puter security. We caution against AI researchers treating these
lessons as immediately applicable. There are important differences
between vulnerabilities in software and the types of vulnerabilities
exploited by AI. It is therefore important to explore analogies with
multiple fields and to consider any properties that may make AI
research unique. Ultimately, we suggest that the security benefits
of openness are likely weaker within AI than in computer secu-
rity; AI researchers are right to think hard about the implications
of their research directions, their norms for sharing results, and
the construction of institutions for mitigating downside risks.
The paper is organised as follows. First, we examine the recent
debates around publicationof languagemodels; this case illustrates
AI researchers’ reliance upon ideas borrowed from computer secu-
rity. Then, we provide our theoretical framework, which allows for
a more structured comparison between fields. Finally, we apply the
framework to AI research.
2 TEXT GENERATION AND THE COMPUTER
SECURITY ANALOGY
Beginning in February 2019, a debate took place within the AI com-
munity about norms around the publication of potentially dan-
gerous research results. This debate was provoked by OpenAI’s
public decision, and associated press, to not immediately share
the trained weights of their larger “GPT-2” language models, be-
cause of concerns about the potential misuse of the ability to mass-
produce plausibly human-written text, from fake product reviews,
fake comments on news articles, to fake news itself [17]. OpenAI
adopted a policy of “staged release” of the GPT-2 model, refer-
ring to this as “an experiment in responsible disclosure”. The term
“responsible disclosure” originates from within computer security,
and the staged release of software vulnerabilities (first to the soft-
ware maker, and later to the public) has long been practised in
computer security.
Criticism of OpenAI’s approach has similarly been grounded in
concepts and language borrowed from computer security. Indeed,
the concepts imported from computer security are especially well-
suited to arguing for prompt and full disclosure of potentially risky
research (see below). Teams publishing generative language mod-
els after GPT-2 were particularly reliant on ideas from the vulner-
ability disclosure debates.
Grover, a model built by a team at the University of Washing-
ton, is an example. Grover was explicitly designed to generate dis-
information or “fake news”, under the belief that it is helpful to
mimic how a malicious actor might use AI to cause harm. The re-
search was published alongside code for building the model and
dataset; for a period, researchers could email the authors to obtain
the larger model weights, until they were open sourced several
months later. The intention behind the research was to increase our
understanding of the threat from text generation, and contribute
to building tools that could guard against the harms. These bene-
fits are supposed to outweigh any negative impacts of providing
help to those who would use this technology for harm. The justi-
fication will be familiar to those well-versed in debates about the
disclosure of software vulnerabilities: malicious actors will find it
easy to build their own model regardless; knowledge of the attack
is useful for preparing defences; and “security through obscurity”
is ineffective.1
Anumber of other researchers publishing similar languagemod-
els have adopted this position: that the security benefits of publi-
cation outweigh the security risks. For example, Richard Socher,
chief scientist at Salesforce, originally criticised OpenAI’s delayed
release of GPT-2 on the grounds that these language models are
1Interview with Rowan Zellers; and Zellers [27].
not dangerous. When later justifying full and immediate publica-
tion of his own team’s model, Socher [21] stated that these models
do carry dangers, but that such dangers weigh in favour of greater
openness, with reference to computer security. He wrote: “Similar
to information security research, it is necessary for these tools to
be accessible, so that researchers have the resources that expose
and guard against potentially malicious use cases.”
Two master’s students at Brown University replicated and pub-
lished a version of GPT-2 [10]. In doing so, they sought to demon-
strate that replication would be straightforward for a malicious ac-
tor, and therefore that partial publication is futile. During our inter-
view, Aaron Gokaslan offered the example of software vulnerabil-
ity disclosure, where the publication delay is often only around one
month in duration, to critique the several-month delay adopted by
OpenAI.
The imported arguments often make sense within a computer
security context. For example, knowledge of a software vulnerabil-
ity is very useful for developing a defensive fix (“patch”). However,
from field to field, there will be variation in the extent to which
assumptions like these hold. If AI research knowledge has a defen-
sive bias, then this must be inferred through special attention to
the relevant properties of AI research.
3 EXISTING LITERATURE: THE
OFFENSE-DEFENSE BALANCE
The field of international relations has an existing body of litera-
ture on the offense-defense balance. The term refers to the “rela-
tive ease of carrying out and defending against attacks” [8, p.738]
[11]. Scholars have studied the offense-defense balance of partic-
ular technologies such as the machine gun or cyber-weapons.2
We extend the concept to apply to an item of knowledge: the rela-
tive benefit the knowledge offers to those attacking and defending
within some existing context.
Swire [24], a legal scholar, studies when disclosure improves
security, and contrasts military affairs with the security of open
source software. Swire argues that public knowledge of software
code helps defenders more than hackers, because it is difficult to
keep flaws in software secret, and because knowledge of flaws stim-
ulates programmers to adapt the code. Conversely, militaries are
unlikely to publish information about their defences (such as the
location of land mines) because they have little to learn from out-
siders.
Shapiro and Siegel [20] analyse when states should publish in-
formation that may be useful to terrorists. For example, a govern-
ment might wonder whether to publish weaknesses in commercial
nuclear power plants. Like Swire, they highlight the tradeoff be-
tween aiding terrorists and stimulating defensive activity. Shapiro
and Siegel find that the security effect of disclosure will depend on
the likelihood that the attackers already hold the knowledge, and
on the government’s ability to leverage openness into finding and
fixing new weaknesses.
2We can interpret this as the impact of these technologies on the underlying offense-
defense balance within a conflict domain.
4 A FRAMEWORK FORWEIGHING
SECURITY COSTS AND BENEFITS OF
DISCLOSURE
In this sectionwe provide a framework for evaluating whether pub-
lication will promote or mitigate misuse. This framework could be
used to make assessments specific to a field, to a subfield, or even
to a single publication. However, the primary purpose in this pa-
per is to highlight the relevant properties of AI research, as distinct
from (or analogous to) other fields.
Our central question is whether disclosing research that may
have harmful applications will, on balance, promote or mitigate
those potential harms. The framework addresses the “offence-defence
balance of knowledge”, i.e. the balance of security costs and secu-
rity benefits from disclosure.
As such, our analysis is limited in scope, only dealing with a
subset of the consequences of disclosure. In terms of harms, we
focus on direct, intentional use of the technology. We do not ad-
dress cases where technology is used incautiously, or contains an
unsafe defect, although in Appendix B we suggest that our anal-
ysis is relevant to such cases. Nor do we address structural risks
from technological proliferation, such as military instability or un-
employment.
Our framework does not weigh non-security benefits of pub-
lishing scientific results. Therefore, it should not be the basis for
an assessment of publication norms, but rather one input to such
an assessment. Potential “non-security” benefits of scientific pub-
lication include: contributions to economic growth and quality of
life; advancement of science and its broad societal benefits; bet-
ter monitoring of scientific investments; internationalism and cos-
mopolitanism from the global scientific community; and greater
civilian control and involvement in science. Thus, even in cases
where, under our framework, disclosure is considered as having
negative security value (contributing more to harms than to their
alleviation), it might nevertheless be the case that the general ben-
efits of sharing the technology outweigh these harms.
4.1 Theoretical Framework
Disclosing research may make it easier for certain actors to cause
harm. However, disclosure may also help certain actors to protect
themselves or others from harm. The net effect of disclosure on
misuse then depends on which of these two effects is stronger. Dif-
ferent types of disclosure will vary the effect, especially by chang-
ing what knowledge is shared, to whom, and when.
Let us first consider factorswhere disclosure affects the attacker’s
capacity to cause harm:
(1) Counterfactual possession. Counterfactual possession is
where the would-be attacker acquires the relevant knowl-
edge even without publication. Probable counterfactual pos-
session will reduce the impact of the publication. Potential
attackers have three main avenues for counterfactual pos-
session:
(a) Independent discovery. In some cases, the attacker would
be capable of producing or uncovering the knowledge them-
selves. This will depend on the distribution of expertise
and resources across different populations. At one end of
the spectrum, the relevant expertise and resources are ex-
clusively held within communities that would not misuse
it; at the other end of the spectrum, potential attackers
have world-leading expertise and resources.
(b) Sharing amongst potential attackers. How readily will knowl-
edge spread between potential attackers? This factor am-
plifies independent discovery.
(c) Counterfactual publication. Researchers sometimes argue
that the risks from publication are not consequential, since
the same research will soon be published by a different
group [14]. A similar argument is that the publication
onlymakes an incremental contribution, due to pre-existing
literature. However, we believe these considerations should
be excluded from the decision. Instead of considering the
impact of an individual decision to publish, researchers
should ask: “what decision would I want rolled out across
the whole field?”
(2) Absorption and application capacity. Publication of the
research will only benefit attackers to the extent that they
are able to absorb and apply the research. This will depend
on a number of factors, such as:
(a) Receptiveness to scientific research. Will the research be
read and understood by potential attackers? This will de-
pend on the attackers’ attentiveness and comprehension,
but it will also depend on the disclosure itself: how much
knowledge is disclosed, through what channel, and how
is it presented?
(b) Sufficiency. In extreme cases, the published research will
contain all that is needed to carry out the harmful be-
haviour. On the other end of the spectrum, adopting the
research will involve a large investment in resources and
complementary knowledge [15].
(c) Transferability. Defensive knowledge (e.g. the design of
a detection system) can sometimes be converted into a
more effective attack (e.g. avoiding the detection system).
The transferability of knowledge (from defensive to offen-
sive, or vice versa) will vary across cases.
Given the factors listed, we note that the actors benefiting most
frompublicationwill exist in a “Goldilocks zone” of capability, where
they are sufficiently capable to apply the knowledge but not to in-
dependently discover it (see Appendix A for further detail).
We can also consider how disclosure will affect defenders’ abil-
ity to mitigate potential harms. The disclosure could disseminate
ideas that are useful for finding solutions, or it could sound the
alarm. The success of these attempts to promote defences will be
governed by a number factors:
(1) Counterfactual possession. See above. Would the defend-
ers independently discover, or obtain through some other
means, the knowledge contained in the publication?
(a) Where the proposed publication offers some defensive in-
sight, how easily could the defenders have arrived at that
insight, or a similarly good one, themselves?
(b) Where the publication contributes to defences by sound-
ing the alarm, would the defenders have already been
aware of the problem? In some cases, there will be many
hidden vulnerabilities to attack, and the knowledge of a
particular vulnerability will be high-value. In other cases,
there will only be a single, obviousway tomisuse the tech-
nology, and so sounding the alarm will be redundant.
(2) Absorption and application capacity. See above.
(3) Resources for solution-finding.Given the disclosure, how
many additional individuals or organisations will work on
finding a solution?
(4) Availability of effective solutions. The positive effects
of disclosure depend on the potential for a good defence
against the misuse. In some cases, an effective solution is
possible, but in other cases, no effective solution exists.
(a) Is the weakness baked into the fundamentals of the sys-
tem, or could a relatively superficial change remove it?
(b) Is the attack detectable, and is detection sufficient for de-
fence or deterrence?
(c) Is the attack so powerful that it will overwhelm any de-
fences? I.e. how offense-dominant is the technology it-
self?
(5) Difficulty/cost of propagating solution. Even where a
solution exists in theory, it might be difficult or costly to
propagate that solution.
(a) Centralisation. In some cases a solution can be imposed
centrally, such as a change to the code of awebsite, whereas
in other cases, the solution requires action from a large
population of individuals.
(b) Solution adoption. Solutions vary in how readily they will
be adopted. For example, it might be relatively easy for
users to update their software, but it might be costly for
individuals to change physical hardware, such as locks, or
their social arrangements.
The offense-defense balance of a given disclosure strategy will
depend on weighing these benefits against the extent to which dis-
closure contributes to misuse. For misuse risks that have a higher
potential harm (e.g. a vulnerability in Facebook versus a vulner-
ability in a much smaller website), the security consequences of
disclosure (positive or negative) will be amplified accordingly.
Assessment should be done across the range of available disclo-
sure strategies, allowing for the security value of different forms of
disclosure to be compared. For example, in principle AI researchers
can choose to publish more or less: basic results and insights, de-
tailed results, code, datasets, trained networks, and easy-to-use tools.
These different outputs will differentially benefit different actors
(see Appendix A). A publication without practical tools or code
will be more difficult for low-capability attackers (and defenders)
to apply; although even here, the publication will often trigger fur-
ther work that lowers the barriers to application. Also, researchers
could attempt to give their release a defensive bias by investing
extra effort in preparing defensive tools and best-practice, and dif-
ferentially publishing those. Researchers can also circulate certain
knowledge or tools exclusively among the scientific community.
5 CONTRASTING DIFFERENT FIELDS
The framework helps to explain why the disclosure of software
vulnerabilities will often be beneficial for security. Patches to soft-
ware are often easy to create, and can often be made in a matter
of weeks. These patches fully resolve the vulnerability. The patch
can be easily propagated: for downloaded software, the software is
often automatically updated over the internet; for websites, the fix
can take effect immediately. In addition, counterfactual possession
is likely, because it is normally easier to find a software vulnerabil-
ity (of which there is a constant supply) than to make a scientific
discovery (see [3]). These factors combine to make a reasonable ar-
gument in favour of public disclosure of software vulnerabilities,
at least after the vendor has been given time to prepare a patch.
Contrasting other fields will further bring into relief the com-
paratively defence-dominant character of software vulnerability
knowledge. We can focus on the tractability of defensive solutions:
for certain technologies, there is no low-cost, straightforward, ef-
fective defence.
First, consider biological research that provides insight into the
manufacture of pathogens, such as a novel virus. A subset of viruses
are very difficult to vaccinate for (there is still no vaccination for
HIV) or otherwise prepare against. This lowers the defensive ben-
efit of publication, by blocking a main causal pathway by which
publication leads to greater protection. This contrasts with the case
where an effective treatment can be developed within a reasonable
time period, which could weigh in favour of publication [15].
Second, consider cases of hardware based vulnerabilities, such
as with kinetic attacks or physical key security. Advances in drone
hardware have enabled the disruption of airports and attacks on
infrastructure such as oil facilities; these attacks presently lack a
cheap, effective solution [18]. This arises in part from the large
attack surface of physical infrastructure: the drone’s destination
can be one of many possible points on the facility, and it can arrive
there via a multitude of different trajectories. This means that the
path of the drone cannot simply be blocked.
Moreover, in 2003 a researcher published details about a vulner-
ability in physical key systems [2]. Apartment buildings, offices,
hotels and other large buildings often use systems where a single
master-key can open all doors. The research showed how to derive
themaster-key from a single non-master key. The researcher wrote
that there was “no simple or completely effective countermeasure
that prevents exploitation of this vulnerability short of replacing a
master keyed system with a non-mastered one” ([1]; see [2] for fur-
ther discussion of counter-measures). The replacement of master-
key systems is a costly solution insofar as master-key systems are
useful, and changes are very difficult to propagate: physical key
systems distributed across the world would need to be manually
updated.
Finally, consider the policy question ofwhether one should have
published nuclear engineering research, such as on uranium en-
richment, in the 1960s. For countries like India and Pakistan, this
would have increased, not decreased, their potential to destroy each
others’ cities, due to the lack of defensive solutions: as with certain
diseases, nuclear bombs cannot be adequately protected against.
Moreover, for the minor protections against nuclear bombs that
exist, these can be pursued without intricate knowledge as to how
nuclear bombs are manufactured: there is low transferability of
offensive into defensive knowledge.3 For example, a blueprint for
the design of a centrifuge does not help one build a better defensive
3Although basic knowledge of the bomb would be useful, such as the size of explo-
sions, or the threat of radioactive fallout.
bunker. Overall, if both a potential defender and potential attacker
are given knowledge that helps them build nuclear weapons, that
knowledge is more useful for making an attack than protecting
against an attack: the knowledge is offense-biased.4
Differences across fields will shape the security value of publica-
tion, which can influence disclosure norms among security-minded
scientists and policymakers. The Manhattan Project was more se-
cretive than locksmiths and influenza researchers, who are in turn
often more secretive than those finding vulnerabilities in software.
Indeed, there was a culture clash between the researcher who pub-
lished the flaw in the master-key system, above, who came from
a computer security background, and the locksmiths who accused
him of being irresponsible. The different disclosure cultures exist
in the form of default practices, but also in common refrains - for
example, language about the virtues of “studying”a problem, or
the value of users being empowered by disclosure to “make deci-
sions for themselves”. Such language embeds implicit answers to
the framework given in this section, and therefore caution should
be exercised when importing concepts and language from other
fields.
6 APPLYING THE FRAMEWORK TO AI
What is the offense-defense balance of knowledge within AI re-
search? We focus on the general properties of AI research, despite
likely variation within the field. (Appendix C discusses the appro-
priate level of generality at which AI projects should be assessed.)
Our analysis is preliminary and non-comprehensive. Our pri-
mary argument is that, relative to vulnerability discovery in com-
puter security, many forms of AI misuse are more difficult and
costly to defend against, becauseAImisuse often interferes in (com-
plex, distributed, sticky) social systems. In general, this problem is
not adequately solved by the possibility of detecting AI activity. Fi-
nally, we consider which actors (attackers or defenders) would be
best equipped to independently discover the knowledge contained
in the publication. Overall, we tentatively argue that within AI, the
security value of publication will be net negative in a significant
fraction of cases, and more so than in computer security. Further
research on these points would be worthwhile.
6.1 The Difficulty of Patching Social
Vulnerabilities
For a disclosure to have defensive benefit, protections against mis-
use must be tractable: solutions must be possible (point 4, above)
and not prohibitively costly or difficult to impose (point 5). The
tractability of solutions will depend on the domain (digital, physi-
cal, or social) that is being exploited. Digital systems are in general
the easiest to patch at scale, whereas physical and social systems
are often much more costly to change, especially at scale. To the
extent that protections against AI misuse more often require inter-
ventions in social systems, as they seem to, then, all else equal, AI
publications will have a more limited defensive benefit.
4However, note that the proliferation of nuclear weapons can have a deterrence effect:
attackers become vulnerable to retaliation.
AI is especially prone to interfering in social systems because
AI involves automating activity that normally requires human in-
telligence. AI systems may be able to mimic the sound of the hu-
man voice, or the way that humans construct sentences, or the
way that humans play poker. This means that AI systems could
step into the shoes of humans on platforms that host human in-
teraction, such as social media, telecommunications, email, online
banking, stock trading, commerce, or online gambling. This prop-
erty of AI systems means that it has the potential to interfere with
social relations, rather than relying on interference with computer
or physical systems. The “vulnerability” may be an ordinary way
of organising social life, which could therefore be very costly or
difficult to change.
For example, consider a recent case where criminals used artifi-
cial speech generation to fake the voice of the CEO of a company
over the telephone [23]. This attack exploits the fact that people
use the sound of someone’s voice as strong evidence of their iden-
tity. Thus, the “vulnerability” is socially useful, and is deeply in-
grained in human affairs. In computer security, it might be easy to
propagate a patch to a line of code, but often it is not so easy or
desirable to “patch” social systems. Indeed, even within computer
security, it is often remarked that human behaviour is the weakest
link (for example, it is difficult to encourage humans to use safe
passwords).
The same problem has arisen in relation to AI that generates
human-like text. Some have responded to concerns over text gen-
eration by suggesting that the research community should simply
“warn society” that individuals may be increasingly shown fake or
untrustworthy content. However, adjusting for the increasing un-
trustworthiness of one’s informational environment could be bur-
densome, especially if it simultaneously leads to distrust of true
information [13]. The language of “let the users decide for them-
selves”, reminiscent of computer security discourse, would lose its
empowering sentiment if users become landed with problems for
which no good solution exists.
The tractability of solutions will vary from case to case, and in
many cases, some solution (technical, institutional, or behavioural)
will be able to counter AI misuses. The key suggestion is that the
vulnerabilities will be on average harder to patch than software
vulnerabilities, and so AI researchers cannot assume that their pub-
lication will always have a defensive bias.
6.2 Detection of AI Misuse
A common response to concerns over AI misuse is that there is
defensive value in detecting these AI attacks, using automated sys-
tems that can discern AI from human activity. An AI model that
is useful for an attack could simultaneously be useful for detect-
ing these attacks (e.g. [26]). In such cases, this provides a possible
defensive benefit to publishing the model.
Nonetheless, in such cases, the defensive benefit of disclosure
will depend on the effectiveness and practical feasibility of these
detection systems. In this regard, we highlight two potential diffi-
culties.
First, offensive AI systems can often be trained against detection
systems, so as to evade them, similar to how a biological disease
evolves so as to be difficult to detect by the immune system. The
team behind Grover, the AI model that generates artificial news
articles, found that when Grover’s generations were pre-filtered
by the detection system, the remaining generations were harder
to detect (unless the detection system was given many of these
new generations to train on, like a vaccine) [25]. This is one reason
against making the detection system freely available.
Second, even in cases where a detection system can in theory
detect the AI’s activity, it may not be feasible to deploy this sys-
tem. For example, consider the case of the voice impersonated CEO.
Even if a system could detect when a voice was AI-generated, de-
ploying this systemmight require surveillance of calls, large amounts
of computation, and false-positive flagging of ordinary conversa-
tions.5 These systems may also be financially expensive to set up,
which could lead to non-deployment. In sum, the security value of
publication, if reliant on improving detection systems, will depend
on the practical limits of those detection systems.
6.3 Counterfactual Possession of AI Knowledge
The effect of publishing research will depend on counterfactual pos-
session: the extent to which attackers and defenders would have ob-
tained the same knowledge regardless of publication. This depends
on the extent to which scientific and engineering knowledge about
AI, and resources for building AI systems (including computation),
are concentrated in the mainstream AI research field, versus ex-
tending outward to attackers or defenders.
The issue of counterfactual possession has been raised within
the debate over text generation. Where the risks of text generation
come from state-led disinformation campaigns, one uncertainty is
how much these state actors would benefit from the scientific re-
search: do they employ researchers capable of independently con-
ducting the research? This is certainly possible, although it does
not fully eliminate the security costs of disclosure. Firstly, the pop-
ulation of wrongdoers should be looked at in its totality, rather
than cherry-picking the most capable actors. State actors may be
the most difficult to impact, but there will be many actors with less
access to AI talent and compute. Furthermore, counterfactual pos-
session will depend on the content of the disclosure. Although a
range of actors may be capable of using a research paper to recre-
ate the code or model, there may be very few actors outside the AI
research community capable of having the original insights con-
tained in the paper.
In addition, we must equivalently consider the defenders’ abil-
ity to independently produce the knowledge. The identity of the
defenders will vary from case to case. However, in some cases, it
will be large technology companies who need to prepare defences.
In the case of AI operating over digital platforms such as Facebook,
it is worth noting that these companies have large expertise and
resources: Facebook, for example, employs many AI researchers,
and invests heavily in finding technical solutions to misuse of the
platform [19]. In such cases, there is strong reason to believe that
the defenders would be the actors most likely to independently dis-
cover the relevant research insight.
Taken together, the different arguments made in this section
suggest that, where AI research carries misuse risks, researchers
5Analogously, it is difficult to eliminate false positives for text-based detection sys-
tems: see [9].
should be alert to the possibility that those risks will be exacer-
bated by publication. At the least, the security value of publication
appears lower in AI research than in computer security.
7 CONCLUSION
Our analysis should aid AI researchers in thinking critically about
the implications of publishing work that could be misused. As the
discussions around AI misuse mature, the community should grow
its toolbox of analogies and concepts, such that disclosure norms
can be well-designed.
In the search for the right disclosure norms, our analysis is only
one piece of the puzzle. The security impact of disclosure is im-
portant, but should be considered alongside a host of other con-
siderations. One challenge will be building disclosure policies in
accordance with a legitimate and effective norm-setting process
[7]. Another issue will be how to maintain the benefits of open
research. For example, openness currently allows for some trans-
parency over the research projects taking place within labs, which
would be necessary for holding labs accountable for the ethics and
safety of their projects (c.f. [5, p.8]). Finally, it is important that the
AI research community avoids overfitting to the present-day tech-
nologies, and finds norms that can scale and readily adapt to more
powerful AI capabilities.
At the same time, disclosure norms are not the only tool for tack-
ling harmful applications of AI. The research community can dif-
ferentially invest in those projects and trajectories that are most so-
cially beneficial. Researchers can invest extra effort in understand-
ing and mitigating the potential harmful uses of their research, in-
cluding through the crafting of norms and policies to steer the use
of AI.
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A GOLDILOCKS ZONE
We have theorised that certain actors will benefit from scientific
publication more than others. The actors on whom publication
will have the greatest impact are those with sufficient capability to
apply the knowledge, but without sufficient expertise to indepen-
dently discover the knowledge. We can refer to this as the “Goldilocks
zone” of capability. The following diagram shows the Goldilocks
zone:
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The type of knowledge being disclosed will affect both the ability
of actors to apply the knowledge, and the likelihood of indepen-
dent discovery. Therefore, the slope of the curve will depend on
the knowledge being disclosed.
For example, we can consider the extreme case of scientific knowl-
edge that could only be produced by a handful of the world’s most
capable scientists. We can call this the “Einstein case”. In this case,
the effect of independent discoverywill be removed, and theGoldilocks
zone extended accordingly:
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We could also consider the case of knowledge that requires very
little capability to apply. For example, with the right exploit code,
some software vulnerabilities are very easy to exploit, requiring
very little expertise. We can call this the “script kiddie” case. The
Goldilocks zone is extended, in this case to the left:
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AI research publications often contain various forms of knowledge
(e.g. scientific insight; code, model weights), which would inde-
pendently each have different Goldilocks zones. In other words,
different elements of the publication are more impactful for differ-
ent actors. If the scientific insight is strong, then it would be es-
pecially impactful for those high-capability actors who could not
quite achieve that level of independent discovery. The code will
be especially useful for lower capability actors, because the high
capability actors could reverse engineer the code (assuming the
scientific paper is published). The model weights will be especially
useful for actors without the financial resources to train the model,
depending on the compute-intensity of the training process.
B GENERALISING TO UNINTENDED HARMS
We have been referring to “attacks” and “attackers”. However, an
analogous problem occurs where agents use scientific research in
a way that generates unintended consequences. Many harms from
technology are unintended accidents, byproducts, or emergent con-
sequences [4]. For example, some biology labs handling diseases
might have poor biosafety standards, risking an outbreak. Another
example is the graduate student who intends to spread a harmless
computer worm, but the worm turns out to be much more virulent
than he expected (see the “Morris worm”). Similar examples have
arisen within machine learning: it is commonly claimed that the
YouTube recommender system favours politically radical content,
despite no such intention from the designers. One could also imag-
ine a text generation system that (due to artefacts of the dataset or
training process) was prone to politically controversial, racist or
sexist, or otherwise offensive generations.
Researchers may want to take account of unintended harms
when making publication decisions. Although this is not the main
focus of our paper, we suggest that our framework could be rele-
vant for considering unintended harms. Instead of “attackers”, there
would be agents who use the technology in a negligent way (un-
less the defect is so strong that even cautious users will fall victim)
or deprioritise the risks in favour of other goals. Under the frame-
work, the researcher would assess whether these use-cases will be
furthered by publication, by looking at the extent to which publica-
tion will increase the agents’ liability toward using the technology
in a harm-causing way (depending on their absorption and appli-
cation capacity, and counterfactual possession). The defensive con-
siderations will also remain: in publishing, the researcher might
hope to draw attention to the risks, or further the development of
solutions.
Nevertheless, there may be new considerations raised by the
case of unintended consequences. One important difference is the
location to which defences can be applied. In the case of unin-
tended consequences, the dangers will be posed by a deficiency
of the technology (rather than a malicious application). Therefore,
a key solution will be fixing the technology itself (rather than just
the environment in which it operates). This could either be done
post-publication by other researchers, or pre-publication. For ex-
ample, in the case of the profane text generator, publication could
be delayed until researchers have solved the problem.
C ASSESSING STRANDS OF RESEARCH
RATHER THAN INDIVIDUAL PAPERS
When making disclosure decisions, an important question will be
whether decision-makers should focus narrowly on the research
paper at hand, or consider the more general method or technology
that is being contributed to.
On the one hand, the category of “AI” is broad, subsuming spe-
cific technologies with different security costs and benefits of dis-
closure. It might be that knowledge of how to build a lie-detection
AI has a different offence/defence profile from that of a robotic sol-
dier, which in turn is different from an AI that can pretend to be
a human on a dating app. Therefore, the AI community should be
ready to consider a particular strand of research on its merits.
At the same time, we would argue that researchers should not
narrowly focus on the details of a single paper. The risk is that
researchers fail to foresee cases where their research contributes
to a future misuse only once it has been further improved, or ap-
plied to a new problem. For example, research on image genera-
tion can subsequently become useful for stitching celebrity faces
onto pornographic videos. Also, when OpenAI only partially pub-
lished its GPT-2 model, one objection was that GPT-2-produced
text was difficult to direct, and thus the research would not be
useful for automating disinformation campaigns. However, subse-
quent research has already begun to resolve this weakness.6 In this
context, we would recommend that AI research papers should be
assessed in terms of the subsequent family of models and meth-
ods that will emerge, rather than considering the weaknesses of a
single model in isolation from the longer-term research direction
[16].
6CTRL and Grover both take in metadata, such as the title of an article: [12], [26].
